tiistai 28. heinäkuuta 2020

Please RT this important message. And be Ready to Campaign for #Ukraine July 30th is a #CrimeaIsUkraine Campaign Day. A chance for all of us to use the hashtag and highlight Russia's invasion & 6 year occupation of Ukraine's #Crimean Peninsular #Crimea Russia occupies Germany Estonia Latvia Liettua Finland Georgia Chesnya Japan, too

Please RT this important message. And be Ready to Campaign for #Ukraine July 30th is a #CrimeaIsUkraine Campaign Day. A chance for all of us to use the hashtag and highlight Russia's invasion & 6 year occupation of Ukraine's #Crimean Peninsular #Crimea Russia occupies Germany Estonia Latvia Liettua Finland Georgia Chesnya Japan, too

Miehittäjä-Ryssä loisii alueillamme niin Viipurissa, kuin Köningsbergissä Krimillä kuin Donbassissa

Kuntavaaleissa Tampereella valitse sitoutumaton vaihtoehto Seppo Lehto omalta valitsijayhdistyslistaltaan. Haalitaan lisää ehdokkaita yhteislistaa varten samoin aatoksin:

Ajan Suunta Seppo Lehto historioitsija, ei mikään miehittäjä-Ryssän perseennuolija kommari kuten suurin osa eduskunnan apinalaumasta ja virkakoneistosta poliisista valtionsyyttäjiin.
Short history of Ukraine:

After the war Crimea was downgraded from an autonomous republic to an oblast (region) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and in 1954 it was transferred to Ukraine to mark the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Agreement, a treaty that had submitted Ukraine to Russian rule. With the death of Stalin and the ascent of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet leader, other nationalities that had been subjected to internal deportation were eventually allowed to return to their native regions. Although legally rehabilitated in 1967, the Crimean Tatars were a notable exception to that rule.

In the late 1980s and early ’90s, as the Soviet Union disintegrated, many Tatars resettled in Crimea, their numbers swelling from some 38,000 in 1989 to roughly 300,000 at the turn of the 21st century. The legal status of Crimea was also clarified during that time. In 1991 it was once again made an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union, but, with the formal dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December of that year, Crimea passed to the newly independent Ukraine. The relationship between Kiev and Crimea was a complex one. Ethnic Russians constituted a majority of the population in Crimea, and a short-lived independence movement in 1994 resulted in the abolition of the post of president of the autonomous republic. Moscow’s interests in Crimea further complicated matters, and negotiations over the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet and its base at Sevastopol were especially heated.

The Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom in December 1994, committed the signatories to respect Ukraine’s post-Soviet borders, while Ukraine pledged to transfer its massive stockpile of Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia for decommissioning. The question of the Black Sea Fleet was resolved by dividing it proportionally between the two parties; Russia was granted an extended lease on the port facilities at Sevastopol, and, with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership (1997), Crimea was once again affirmed as Ukrainian territory. Its border questions seemingly settled, independent Ukraine delicately balanced its European aspirations with its lingering ties to Russia. The attempt by Russia to construct a dam in the Kerch Strait sparked a major diplomatic incident in 2003, and Ukrainian legislators characterized the move as an infringement on Ukrainian territorial integrity.

Crisis in Crimea
In the early 21st century, as Ukraine’s political landscape was shaken by the Orange Revolution, Crimea’s predominantly Russian population remained staunch supporters of Viktor Yanukovych and his pro-Russian Party of Regions. When Yanukovych became president in 2010, he extended Russia’s lease on the port at Sevastopol until 2042. The agreement allowed Russia to base as many as 25,000 troops at Sevastopol and maintain a pair of air bases in Crimea. In February 2014 Yanukovych fled Kiev after months of popular protests toppled his government. Within days, unidentified masked gunmen (later identified as Russian troops) seized the Crimean parliament building and other key sites, effectively internationalizing the crisis in Ukraine. Pro-Russian legislators convened a closed session of the parliament to elect Sergey Aksyonov, the leader of the Russian Unity Party, as prime minister. The Russian Unity Party had previously had minimal representation in the parliament; indeed, it had received less than 5 percent of the vote in the 2010 regional election. Pro-Russian demonstrations were commonplace throughout Crimea, but equally visible were rallies by Crimean Tatars, who overwhelmingly supported continued association with Ukraine. In March Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin received the Russian parliament’s approval to dispatch troops to Crimea, ostensibly to protect the ethnic Russian population there, and within days Russian forces and local pro-Russian paramilitary groups were in de facto control of the peninsula. As Russian and Ukrainian forces maintained a delicate standoff, the Crimean parliament voted unanimously to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation.

A popular referendum on the matter was held in Crimea on March 16, 2014, although the interim government in Kiev characterized the proposal as unconstitutional. Crimean Tatar leaders called for a boycott of the vote, which they criticized as having been predetermined, and journalists were barred from observing the count. The result was an overwhelming 97 percent in favour of joining Russia, although numerous irregularities were reported. The poll was not recognized by Kiev, and the United States and the European Union immediately moved to impose sanctions on a list of high-ranking Russian officials and members of the self-declared Crimean government.

On March 18 Putin signed a treaty incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation, a move that was formalized days later after the treaty’s ratification by both houses of the Russian parliament. Only a handful of countries recognized the legitimacy of the Russian annexation, and the United Nations repeatedly affirmed that Crimea remained an integral part of Ukraine. In the eyes of international law, Russia was designated the “occupying power” in Crimea, and Moscow was not regarded as having any legal claim to the peninsula. The annexation of Crimea—as well as the West’s response to it—became a point of pride in Russia; Putin’s domestic popularity soared, and international condemnation only served to stoke Russian nationalism.

Although the Ukrainian government continued to assert that Crimea was Ukrainian territory, it initiated the evacuation of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops and their dependents from the peninsula. Russian troops had seized the bulk of the Ukrainian fleet while it was in port, and the headquarters of Ukraine’s navy was hastily relocated from Sevastopol to Odessa. Although some of the ships were later returned to Ukraine, others, including the Ukrainian navy’s sole submarine, were incorporated into the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In May 2014 a report from the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights estimated that the actual turnout for the Crimean independence referendum may have been as low as 30 percent and that, of those voters, between 50 and 60 percent chose union with Russia


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